Trade in America 39.

THE

RECOVERY of AMERICA

DEMONSTRATED TO BE

PRACTICABLE by GREAT-BRITAIN,

UPON

PRINCIPLES and DEDUCTIONS

THAT ARE

CLEAR, PRECISE, and CONVINCING.

Lee 1782

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CONTAINING, AMONGST OTHER MATTERS,

A Copy of the Out-lines of a Plan for re-inſtating the BRITISH EMPIRE,

ADDRESSED TO THE

EARL of SHELBURNE,

When his Lordſhip was one of his Majeſty's Principal Secretaries of State,

AND DELIVERED TO

Mr. NEPEAN, one of the UNDER SECRETARIES, in the Month of MAY laſt.

AS ALSO A

COPY of an ADDRESS

TO SEVERAL OF THE

CABINET MINISTERS, on the 28th of NOVEMBER laſt,

Offering to demonſtrate the Practicability of Recovering America, and to ſhew the Immenſity of our National Reſources.

By the AUTHOR,

A MAN OF NO PARTY,

WHO WILL SPEEDILY PUBLISH

An ESSAY on NATIONAL RESOURCES.

LONDON.

Printed for G. WILKIE, No. 71, *St. Paul's Church Yard*.

MDCCLXXXII.

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THIS

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IS

HUMBLY SUBMITTED

TO THE

CONSIDERATION

OF

All the good People, Subjects of the
BRITISH EMPIRE,

AT THIS

IMPORTANT CRISIS.

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ON the 28th of November, 1782, an addreſs was tranſmitted to ſeveral of the cabinet miniſters,* to the following purpoſe, viz.

The addreſſer thinks it his duty to communicate to his Majeſty's miniſters, *at this criſis*, that he can demonſtrate the practicability of recovering America.

That though this will be practicable, at any period before the acknowledgement of American Independance by Great Britain, yet as

* The Lord Chancellor, Firſt Lord of the Treaſury, Chancellor of the Exchequer, Two Secretaries of State, Commander in Chief.

as the nation is ſo deep in the conteſt, and armed at all points, it is now more practicable than it can be after a ceſſation of hoſtilities.

He can alſo produce, *a ſcale of national reſources from one to ten millions ſterling per annum*, without being oppreſſive upon individuals, or the publick, which is by no means the caſe with France, or the other powers at war.

His principles and deductions are clear, preciſe, and lead to immediate conviction.

He will attend the appointments of his Majeſty's miniſters on this ſubject, which he conceives to be of the firſt importance to the King, and the nation.

As no notice has been taken of this addreſs, by the miniſters to whom it was transmitted on the above date, the author conceives that it is now his duty humbly to ſubmit the important ſubjects alluded to therein, to the conſideration of the public, to whom they cannot be diſintereſting, and he hopes not unacceptable at this criſis.

For no force of oratory, no ſtrength of reaſoning, can ever poſſibly lead any real patriot

triot, who fully inveſtigates the ſubject, into any other opinion than that the Independance of America, and her political ſeparation as a ſovereign ſtate, is an event big with misfortunes to Great Britain, the greateſt that can poſſibly be conceived.

Without going into a detail of the innumerable misfortunes, already pointed out by many abler pens, as the inevitable conſequence to the parent ſtate of ſo fatal a diſmemberment:—The whole may be ſummed up in this one, that from that day on which the Independance of America ſhall be finally and irrevocably acknowledged, the Britiſh navy, that great, and as yet unconquerable bulwark of the nation, muſt naturally diminiſh, which could be fully proved were it now neceſſary to enter into ſuch a digreſſion.

Setting aſide alſo for the preſent, the diſcuſſion of whether the *prerogative alone*, has or has not ſufficient authority to grant ſuch a diſmemberment of the empire, it muſt be ſome conſolation to all true patriots, that notwithſtanding the preſent forwardneſs, in which that event may be conſidered, it has been declared by high authority in an auguſt aſſembly, that the Independance of

America is not yet irrevocably conceded, *even by the prerogative alone.*

Therefore as one of the ableſt orators, and certainly the greateſt advocate for American Independance in the Britiſh ſenate, has very lately declared in his place,---that it was a thing not deſirable for this nation; that he was a friend to the ſubjugation of America, as long as he thought it practicable, and was an advocate for American Independance only from the neceſſity of it.---If then the following eſſay ſhews that that neceſſity does not exiſt; but that on the contrary the recovery of America is yet practicable, the author flatters himſelf that he will thereby render the moſt eſſential ſervice to his country, and that however unequal he is to ſo important a taſk, it nevertheleſs will be received by the public with candour and indulgence, and that it cannot give offence to any man, or deſcription of men, who lay claim to be ſubjects of this realm.

The following then are ſome of the principles, upon which the author deems the recovery of America to be practicable, viz.

That

That, As the confederate ſtates of America, could not have had a probability of obtaining Independance by force of arms, againſt the power of Great Britain alone, had it not been for their alliance with France, together with the engagements of Spain and Holland, in a war with Great Britain;

So conſequently, they have not power, or reſources to eſtabliſh, or ſupport themſelves as one ſovereignty, totally and abſolutely independant of the *powers of Europe*, who either *collectively*, or the *ſuperior part* of whom, now can, and ever will be able to controul America.

The recovery of America by Great Britain, will therefore at all times be practicable, by forming alliances to counter-balance thoſe of America. Or what amounts to the ſame thing, by reducing the European allies of thoſe ſtates, to the *alternative of a dereliction of them*, or *a contravention of European intereſts*. Which latter will of courſe produce alliances for Great Britain, equal, if not ſuperior to thoſe formed by America; and then the conteſt between Great Britain and America, will be reduced to its original ſtate, in which caſe diſpoſitions of the Bri-

tiſh force and meaſures yet unattempted can be ſhewn, for ſpeedily recovering an equitable and liberal dependance of thoſe revolted colonies upon the parent ſtate.

As the failure of the American war, muſt therefore appear to be principally owing to the want of alliances on the part of Great Britain, to counter-balance thoſe formed by America.

It would be abſurd to ſuppoſe then — that one of the moſt powerful nations in the world, has not the means to obtain alliances, when the American Colonies, without general police, or eſtabliſhed reſources, unformed, unknown, and not even at this hour acknowledged by more than two powers of Europe, (France and Holland) as a ſovereign ſtate, has long ſince been able to obtain ſo conſiderable ones.

The fact is, that Great Britain can obtain, nay even enforce, ſuch alliances, as long as Hanover is hereditary in the ſame ſovereign, which God ever continue.

This German territory, which in the laſt war was depreciated, even by the ableſt politicians of that day, as a dead weight, and as a uſeleſs ſink of Britiſh men and money, could

could have been in the preſent war, and may yet be, turned to the ſalvation of the Britiſh empire, for the following clear reaſons:

That there are two great powers * on the Continent, who entertain mutual jealouſies of each other.

That each of theſe powers are equally anxious to extend the maritime commerce of their ſubjects, though neither of them have any naval force to defend or protect ſuch commerce.

That therefore the attack of Great Britain upon the maritime commerce of either of theſe powers, without any infraction of territorial poſſeſſions, could only be retorted by an attack upon Hanover, which could not be juſtified upon the grounds of a maritime attack from Great Britain, as each of thoſe powers ought of right to be able to defend their maritime commerce by a naval force, without retorting colaterally upon Hanover, to the diſturbance of the empire.

That ſuch an attack of either of thoſe powers upon Hanover, would alarm the jealouſy

* The Emperor of Germany and the King of Pruſſia.

louſy of the other, and would afford juſt grounds not only for repelling that attack, but under colour thereof, for obtaining their own private views.

That the engagement of thoſe powers in ſuch a conteſt, added to the preſent embroiled ſtate of Europe, would conſequently and undoubtedly involve all the preſent neutral powers in the war, and would reduce France to the *alternative of a dereliction of America, or a contravention of European intereſts*, whereby Great Britain would obtain the moſt powerful allies.

The concluſion of which war would be, that the different European powers at war (except France) having no intereſt in the Independance of America, would, to ſecure peace in future upon that head, guarrantee, and could enforce, the equitable and liberal dependance of thoſe colonies upon Great Britain.

If theſe principles are allowed to have weight, the author may perhaps be blamed for not offering them to the conſideration of miniſters, until the 28th of November laſt, the date of the prefixed Addreſs on that head; but ſuch blame will ſubſide, when it

is

is known that he has not been inattentive to what he conceived to be the national intereſts, or wanting in endeavours to promote the accompliſhment of ſo deſirable an end, as the reſtoration of the Britiſh Empire; which will appear from the following copy of a paper delivered by him, ſo long ago as the month of May laſt, to Mr. NEPEAN, Under Secretary of State, and addreſſed to the EARL of SHELBURNE, then one of his Majeſty's principal Secretaries of State; which paper will ſerve further to elucidate this ſubject, but of which he never found the leaſt notice taken.

(COPY.)

(C O P Y.)

OUTLINES of a PLAN

TO REINSTATE THE

BRITISH EMPIRE,

BY A

GENERAL WAR.

AS it is humbly conceived, that in the preſent conjuncture, a laſting and honourable peace cannot be obtained for Great Britain, to bring on a general war may be the beſt method of accompliſhing that deſirable end.

If a general war is brought on as intended by this plan, the Emperor of Germany, and the Empreſs of Ruſſia, will be led into alliances with Great Britain.

It appears to be in the power of the King, to immediately bring on a general war, but with ſome riſque to his Majeſty's German dominions.

If

If the Electorate of Hanover (being an abſtracted territory) is riſqued for the re-inſtatement of the Britiſh empire, it ſhould be guaranteed at the expence of Great Britain; which it is expected may be done, without Britiſh troops, upon a ſubſidy of money only, for which there are ſtill ample reſources.

A maritime war againſt Pruſſia, by Great Britain ſeizing Pruſſian ſhips, (without any territorial infraction) will produce a general war.

Oſtenſible grounds can be given for ſuch an attack; a good ground ſeems to exiſt, in the King of Pruſſia's countenancing and protecting the Dutch trade under his flag.*

The maritime commerce of Pruſſia has long been a riſing and favourite object with that King, but he has no navy to protect it. If therefore it is attacked as propoſed, he

 can

* The Emperor by an edict in September or October 1782, forbids all veſſels trading with the Belligerent powers from uſing his flag, except ſuch as actually belong to and are cleared out of his ports, which is a convincing proof that he knows where, and in what manner he is vulnerable, and fully juſtifies the principles and policy here laid down ſeveral months before ſuch edict.

can have no retort, except to wound Great Britain through Hanover.

The invaſion of Hanover by Pruſſia with negociations at the Courts of Vienna and Peterſburgh will procure allies for Great Britain, and will rouſe all Europe into action.

For the Emperor no doubt looks forward to the recovery of Sileſia, wreſted from his mother, almoſt at the moment of his birth, by the King of Pruſſia, who has alſo recently prevented the acquiſition of part of Bavaria to the Houſe of Auſtria. And it is to be apprehended that the Pruſſian power already ſo great in the empire, will upon the expected re-union of the Margravate of Anſpach-Bareith, to the electorate of Brandenburg, upon the death of the preſent reigning Margrave, quite over-balance that of the Houſe of Auſtria, and in all probability may become dictatorial.

The Emperor therefore, by having occaſion to oppoſe in his public capacity, of chief of the Empire, and conſervator of the integral great Germanic body, the aggreſſion of Pruſſia upon Hanover, (for which the *naval war* of Great Britain againſt his ſhips can afford

afford no ſubſtantial reaſon, as of right he ought to be able to protect his commerce at ſea, without retorting the aggreſſion of Great Britain colaterally upon Hanover to the diſturbance of the Empire) will be furniſhed with the moſt juſtifiable grounds, to attempt the recovery of Sileſia, the poſſeſſion of part of Bavaria, to prevent the further aggrandizement of the Houſe of Brandenburg, and to cruſh the preſent great power of the Pruſſian monarch; and the whole of the Empire will ſecond the Emperor, in repelling an attack of Pruſſia upon Hanover.

It is conceived that the proſpect of ſo many attainments, ariſing out of ſuch a quarrel, will readily induce the Emperor to conclude a treaty offenſive, and defenſive, with Great Britain, and to guarantee Hanover upon a ſubſidy of money, without requiring more troops than what that electorate can furniſh.

The intereſt that Ruſſia has in Poland, will oblige her to take part in an European continental war; and her private views will lead her into an alliance with Great Britain and the Emperor; for they can beſt guarantee her advantageous treaty with the Porte, or aſſiſt in future againſt the Ottomans: be-

ſides which, the partition of Dantzig, and of Pruſſian Poland, will become great objects of the propoſed war, both to Ruſſia and the Emperor, for the poſſeſſion or controul of Dantzig, as is at preſent the caſe with Pruſſia, would be an attainment of the higheſt conſequence to Ruſſia, and Pruſſian Poland would be an equivalent to the Emperor.

As the armed neutrality will therefore be a ſecondary object, as well with Ruſſia as the Emperor, and as the other neutral powers, who have acceded thereto, are unable to enforce any meaſures, Pruſſia can reap no advantage from that treaty, and therefore muſt either tamely ſubmit to the propoſed attack of Great Britain upon his maritime commerce, or ſecure his trade by treaty with her, which will leave him open to ſimilar attacks from the Houſe of Bourbon, Holland, and America; or, as the only retort in his power, will attack Hanover, which will procure allies for Great Britain, as has been ſhewn, and will alſo prove of the higheſt advantage to her, by producing a general war.

For,

For, in ſuch conjuncture, France muſt join Pruſſia, and muſt maintain a powerful army in Lorraine and Alſace, as well as one in the field of action, which will drain her of men and money, will weaken her at ſea, and moſt probably force her to a *derelict*ion *of America*.

The Dutch will then alſo gladly ſue for peace and alliance with Great Britain, who may dictate the terms, otherwiſe they muſt fall to the Emperor, which the diſmantling of the barrier towns will greatly favour, as there can now be but little obſtruction againſt carrying the Imperial Arms acroſs the rivers Maeſe and Rhine, into the very bowels of the provinces, which are rich enough to afford contributions equal to the expence of the war, beſides being otherwiſe ſubjugated.

It is the intereſt of both Sweden and Denmark to remain ſtrictly neuter, as the enjoyment of the maritime trade of Europe unmoleſted, during ſuch a conteſt, muſt be ſuperior to any advantages they can reap from an active part in the war; but ſhould Sweden, with a view to Bremen, be led to take part with Pruſſia and France, Denmark

may

may be readily brought into the oppoſite alliance, by the proſpect of obtaining Hamburgh, which has long been a favourite object.

Should Spain continue to aſſiſt France, which in a war of this nature will be wholly againſt her real intereſts, and ſhould the *Porte* alſo take that part, they will be ballanced by ſome of the Italian and German powers, and Portugal; ſo that the principals in this European continental war, will be the Emperor and Ruſſia on the one hand, and Pruſſia and France on the other; the former being a natural alliance with many objects in view, the latter being an alliance of neceſſity, without the proſpect of an attainment.

Great Britain being freed from the proſecution of ſuch a war on the continent of Europe, except by ſubſidy of money for the guarantee of Hanover, will be left at liberty to exert her natural force againſt her enemies, by a vigorous maritime war, with the aſſiſtance of a naval force from Ruſſia, and moſt probably from Holland and Denmark, and will not only be enabled to recover the Britiſh Weſt India Iſlands, but alſo

moſt

moſt probably to conquer thoſe of the Houſe of Bourbon in that quarter; which, as an encouragement to the naval allies, may be divided amongſt them in proportion to their reſpective forces; and by that means the maritime commerce, and of courſe the naval power of the Houſe of Bourbon will be effectually limited.

America then alſo will gladly treat with Great Britain upon terms ſhort of Independance.

And as it is conceived that the following poſition, formed upon the preſent criſis, will be univerſally acknowledged as an inconteſtible truth, viz.

That it is more for the political advantage of all Europe, to involve the different powers thereof in a general war, than to ſuffer *the deſtructive diſmemberment that now threatens to bury the Britiſh Empire in the bottom of the Atlantic.* That empire which for the common benefit of all Europe, has long been the great and neceſſary poize to the ambitious and otherwiſe uncontroulable maritime aggrandiſement of the Houſe of Bourbon, which aggrandiſement, if not

checked, muſt (added to their great continental power) lead to univerſal domination.

Therefore upon a general pacification, to ſecure the peace of Europe in future on that head, and to preſerve the balance of naval power, the European contracting powers ſhould, and no doubt would, *guarantee the equitable and liberal dependance of America upon Great Britain*; which thoſe guarantees (and they only) can at all times enforce, as ſimilar meaſures will always produce ſimilar effects.

And by a pacification, on ſo broad a baſis, as muſt conclude a war of this nature, the claims and poſſeſſions of all the powers of Europe, may be determined and ſecured perhaps for ever; which, for the general benefit of mankind, is a conſummation moſt devoutly to be wiſhed.

May, 1782.

Signed by the Author.

Addreſſed, *To the Right Honourable the Earl of Shelburne, one of his Majeſty's principal Secretaries of State, &c. &c. &c.*

Many

Many other parts of the baſis for recovering America, as conceived by the author, are for the preſent reſerved, for this reaſon, that they may be more ſerviceable by being kept ſecret than if publiſhed; but if *Miniſters* decline requiring them, they will alſo be ſubmitted to public conſideration.

The next object is to ſhew national reſources, as alluded to in the Addreſs to Miniſters at the head of this eſſay, for which purpoſe the author will ſelect out of many which he has formed, only *one* plan, which he will give, as he had the honour to preſent it in perſon to that able financier, and worthy nobleman, LORD NORTH, when his Lordſhip was Chancellor of the Exchequer, but which having been brought in at the cloſe of his Lordſhip's adminiſtration, new modelled from the author's premiſes, was rejected; as it alſo was under another modification, in the ſucceeding Chancellorſhip of Lord John Cavendiſh.

The author therefore, to clear this plan from all the objections under which it reſts, has added a review of it's principles and policy, which he hopes will be convincing to thoſe who honour it with a peruſal; as it

contains ſome new ideas and calculations upon ſome of *the moſt extenſive taxes*, and their operations *upon manufactures*, *commerce*, and the *public*; all which will be immediately publiſhed in another Eſſay.

London,
Dec. 11, 1782.

FINIS.